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Abstract 
This paper presents a pilot study about the applicability of Human Reliability 
Analysis (HRA) in civil aviation. Implementation of a cause-based model of 
intentional pilot errors in dynamic analysis of Approach-To-Landing procedure is 
described. The pilot model focuses on errors as deviations from procedures, and was 
implemented in DYLAM. The results show that the HITLINE methodology is a 
suitable tool to perform dynamic HRA in the civil aviation domain. 
1 Introduction 
Safety is an important issue in civil aviation. The public experiences risk in civil 
aviation by the absolute number of accidents rather than by the accident ratio, 
defined as the number of accidents per flight. The accident ratio seems to have 
reached a stable level in the last years [I]. The expectation is that the number of 
aircraft flights will double in the near future, implying that the accident ratio must 
halve to maintain the same public experience of safety. The current safety 
enhancement will not be sufficient to achieve the desired level of safety. 
About 70% of all accidents occur in the approach, landing, take-off or initial climb 
phases of flight. In these phases both the aircraft crew and the air traffic controller 
play an important role. It is therefore essential to have a very clear understanding 
of the human causes of the failures. There is a need to assess and quantify the 
human factor in safety analysis. However, yet insufficient knowledge exists on the 
human factor in the safety assessment in civil aviation. 
The purpose of this paper is to describe a pilot study about the practical applicability 
of HRA in civil aviation. The depth of the investigation is limited to an existing 
t~amework of dynamical analysis developed by the Joint Research Centre (JRC) [2]. 
This paper focuses on the development and implementation of a cause-based model 
of intentional errors for the dynamic analysis of an Approach-To-Landing procedure. 
2 Context of the study 
The specific ATL procedure used in this study was the same one used in an earlier 
study by [3]. The first part of the ATL was modelled, starting with the descent from 
cruise level to the passing of the Novarra VOR at 4000 ft. 
The basic steps of the procedure considered here are: 
* F1/5/10: extension of flaps to settings 1, 5 or 10 respectively. 
* CA: calibration of the altimeter on QNH (actual air pressure at sea level). 
* LE: levelling off at 4000 ft. 
* CL: reading of the approach checklist, checking the calibration and flap setting. 
Use was made of DYLAM as the simulation engine, and of the pilot model 
developed by JRC, describing the skill-based behaviour, i.e. the actual flying of the 
aircraft. A deterministic simulation model of the aircraft determined the position and 
flight conditions of the airplane at all times, with four degrees of freedom. 
For details of the context of the study see [3,4]. 
3 Development of the pilot model 
The Pilot model from the JRC exercise was extended to include intentional and 
additional unintentional errors. A CAuse-based Behavioural model for Flight 
procedures (CAB-Flight) was developed and incorporated in the JRC simulation to 
simulate these errors. CAB-Flight is a rule-based model describing the pilot's 
behaviour during the correct and erroneous execution of procedural steps of the 
ATL. The model is based on the intentional error model of the HITLINE 
methodology [5,6]. 
An error in CAB-Flight is defined as a deviation from a procedure. The following 
error expressions are identified as part of CAB-Flight for this study: 
* unintentional omission (OM): The pilot unintentionally does not execute an 
action. 
" unintentional commission (UC): The pilot unintentionally executes a procedural 
step in an incorrect way. 
* intentional commission (IC): The pilot intentionally deviates from the procedure 
by performing a different action, because of his perception of what should be done 
in the current situation. 
* procedural action (PR): Normally the steps of a procedure are linked to specific 
conditions to perform it. The procedural action occurs when the pilot decides to 
perform another step of the procedure first. 
* not monitoring (NM): The pilot fails to monitor the aircraft variables in order to 
adjust them. This is not a deviation from a procedure but rather a failure at the skill- 
based level. 
HITLINE assumes that not all errors can occur at all times. Thus, for each 
procedural action, likely errors are identified by considering the procedural 
instruction within the context of flight. The results for two steps of the procedure 
are presented in table 1. It should be emphasised that the principle of such mapping 
is important. Exact mapping may be different from the one presented here. One of 
the limitations of the dynamic simulation techniques is the very large size of the 
resulting dynamic event tree. Thus, mapping selected errors for each procedural step 
helps to reduce the size of the results. 
The skill-based level error of not monitoring can occur at every step. It is regarded 
as temporarily not addressing the tasks of that level. The only possibility for 
recovery from errors in the model is successful reading of the checklist. Other 
possibilities for recovery have been left out for reasons of simplicity. 
Table 1. Possible errors. 
The causal factors affecting errors are modeled using the so-called performance 
influencing factors (PIFs). These factors are used both qualitatively (to identify 
likely errors from the set of possible errors) and quantitatively (to estimate relative 
likelihood for each error). Three categories of PIF are distinguished, related to 
aircraft, procedure and pilot. Additionally, two types of PIFs are distinguished: 
scenario-independent: these PlFs do not change significantly during the 
development of a scenario. An example is training and experience of the crew. 
scenario-dependent: these PFs  change during the development of a scenario. 
Examples include values of parameters and perceived importance of a system. 
procedural 
step 
C A 
LE 
From an exhaustive list of PIFs, collected from human reliability models such as 
THERP, evolutionary models, as well as aviation literature and pilot interviews, a 
small hut relevant set of PIFs was selected for implementation in CAB-Flight. 
The essential modelling element of CAB-Flight is formed by the relations between 
PlFs and errors. These relations are represented in mapping tables, which show the 
generic and specific rules to generate errors as a function of the PlFs. Table 2 shows 
an example of a mapping table. 
description procedural 
step 
calibration of altimeter, 
setting to local air pressure 
levelling flight 
possible 
errors 
OM 
UC 
PR: Fll5110 
OM 
PR:CL,Fl 
description errors 
not performing 
calibration 
wrong air pressure 
flap setting 
not levelling flight 
performing another 
action 
Table 2. Maoping table for scenario-deoendent PIFs. oilot related 
* intentional commission 
to runway 
mismatch between 
procedure 
aircraft behaviour 
Factor 
pilot's diagnosis 
perceived importance 
of certain aspect 
Relative likelihoods associated with possible pilot actions, including successful 
execution of procedural steps and possible errors, are estimated as a function of 
PIFs. For lack of data which is a common problem in human reliability, use is made 
of subjective judgement to assign numbers to these likelihoods. Parameters used for 
quantification are estimated independently for different combinations of PIFs. For 
sin~plicity, each PIF is treated in a binary fashion, e.g. experience is considered in 
terms of experienced or novice crew. For a detailed discussion of the quantification 
scheme, the reader is referred to [4,6]. 
When CAB-Flight is linked with a dynamic simulation tool, the error generation 
provides simulation of errors for each interaction between pilot and aircraft. 
Additionally, this model carries variables which account for dependency of pilot 
action at different times. Three cognitive processes are simulated through the use of 
mapping tables: (1) check behaviour of aircraft variables against expected trends, (2) 
determine global diagnosis of aircraft status, (3) formulate expectations about 
behaviour of variables. The results of the cognitive processes are translated into PIF 
values which are subsequently used to determine possible actions with associated 
probabilities as mentioned above. This information is then used by the simulation 
engine to generate possible branches for the dynamic event tree. 
Mechanism 
confusion when 
something is wrong 
fixation on particular 
aspect I channelling of 
attention 
4 Dynamic analysis results 
Likely Error 
more likely to deviate from 
procedure 
* unintentional omission 
* unintentional commission 
* not monitoring 
* procedural error 
CAB-Flight was incorporated into the pilot model of the JRC simulator. Additional 
"failure states" were assigned to simulate the different errors. Associated 
probabilities were generated prior to simulation and written in appropriate data files 
to be used by DYLAM. It should be noted that whereas CAB-Flight is capable of 
dynamically calculating probabilities, the scheme was not included in the current 
version of DYLAM. This has been done in a similar, independent application to 
dynamic study of nuclear power plants [7]. 
A dynamic event tree is presented in Fig. 1 which includes the following errors: 
Intentional Commission (IC), more tbrust; Procedural action (PR), calibration of 
altimeter at F5; Unintentional Commission (UC) (flaps to 20 instead of 10) and 
omission of checklist reading (OM). A hardware failure is also included in the form 
of flap failure. 
F1 F5 CA F10 LE CL 
75 154 ~n 1 s 0,7919336 
IOM 2 S 0,00437972 
3 S 0,0596078 
4 F 0,000329656 
PR: CA 
/ 261 / 344 5 S 0,0596078 
@!- . 6 S 0,000329656 
7 S 0,000289157 
!OM 8 F 0,00000159916 
9 F 0,07000707 
flap failure 
155 2s 1 259 10 13 0,0092929 
Figure 1 (Dynamic event tree for simulation I) 
A comparison with the JRC analysis shows that success probability is 10.40% 
smaller, which is to be expected since more errors have been introduced to the pilot 
model of the JRC simulation. 
5 Conclusions and recommendations 
The results show the feasibility of dynamic human reliability study to analyse pilot 
errors within the context of aircraft procedures. Moreover, the results show that the 
HITLINE methodology is a suitable tool to perform dynamic HRA in the civil 
aviation domain. The benefits of a dynamic HRA for civil aviation are to be 
expected in the qualitative analysis. It will be useful in the design of procedures, 
training and man-machine interfaces. 
Currently, due to lack of useful data, the quantitative side of the analysis is still a 
weak point. Still the method itself is simple to use. The determination of the error 
probabilities is traceable for the user. More PIFs can be added without the need to 
change the calculation method. The advantage of this method is that all probabilities 
are conditional, depending on the dynamics of the pilot-aircraft system. This makes 
it possible to take those dynamics into account. 
Future research has to consider the operator model development in more detail, like 
which PIFs needs to be taken into account. Sensitivity analysis must be part of the 
model development. In addition, model validation is important. 
Future research should also help to determine whether dynamic analysis for safety 
assessment will be cost effective in the design of new aircraft. 
Acknowledgement 
The authors would like to thank Frederiek Peek for conducting the research with 
great enthusiasm; Carlo Cacciabue and Giacomo Cojazzi for making it possible for 
Frederiek to perform part of the research at JRC (Ispra) and providing guidance 
during her graduation work; and Peter Wieringa for providing valuable remarks and 
suggestions. 
References 
1. Piers et al. The development of a method for the analysis of societal and 
individual risk due to aircraft accidents in the vicinity of airports. NLR 
report CR 93372 L, 1993 
2. Cacciabue P.C., Cojazzi G. An integrated simulation approach for the 
analysis of pilot-aeroplane interaction. Control Engineering Practice, vol. 
3, no. 2, 1995. 
3. Mancini S. Applicazione di modelli per la valutazione dell'affidabilita 
umana a1 comportamento di un pilota di un velivo civile. Tesi di Laurea 
in Ingeneria Aeronautics, Politecno di Milano, Facolta di Ingegneria, 
1991. 
4. Peek F. Development and implementation of CAB-Flight. NLR 
memorandum IW-95-013. 
5. Macwan A. Methodology for analysis of operator errors during nuclear 
power plants accidents with application to probabilistic risk assessment. 
PhD thesis, University of Maryland, 1992. 
6. Macwan A., Mosleh A. A methodology for modelling operator errors of 
commission in probabilistic risk assessment. Reliability Engineering and 
System safety 45, 1994, pp. 139-157. 
7. Groen F. CAB-SIM: a cause based operator model for use in dynamic 
probabilistic safety assessment for nuclear power plants. Graduation 
report A-713, Faculty of mechanical engineering and marine technology, 
Delft UT, Netherlands, 1995 
